The article highlights the factors of the classification of issuers and their securities (forms of circulation and admission to trading, listing, publicity, type of offering, liquidity, objectivity of pricing) in the context of determining the reasons for the limited number of instruments in Ukraine's regulated market and signs of its unattractiveness for issuers and investors. The author defines peculiarities of the formation and structure of investment portfolios of financial institutions and other investors (in comparison with international indicators) and difficulties of the valuation and diversification of assets. It has been revealed that a sharp reduction in the number of issuers and financial intermediaries (through variable legislation, increased regulatory requirements and controversial enforcement) led to a reduction in liquidity and competition, an increase in transaction costs, and did not contribute to market development, its infrastructure, and the objectivity of pricing.
The emphasis is on the conventionalities of market benchmarks (stock indexes of shares, total capitalization) in Ukraine due to the limited financial instruments, lack of public companies, scanty liquidity, high volatility and artificiality of pricing. Indicated various signs of illiquidity of Ukraine's regulated stock market in comparison with world trading platforms (first of all, in relation to shares), as well as reasons of irregularity of the trades, mainly the purpose oriented conclusion of agreements, absence of active market and actual prices (in particular, due to unsatisfactory regulation of exchange pricing).
However, it is worth emphasizing the significant role of government bonds that differ from other securities in Ukraine in that they have increased liquidity, strong investor demand, more predictability and price adequacy, which is a sufficiently anticipated factor for an underdeveloped stock market.
The author highlights peculiarities and problems of pricing in the underdeveloped stock market, which considerably complicate the task of counteracting market abuse, in particular due to total illiquidity, the absence of contradiction in the implementation of international practice, and subjectivity of the existing regulatory criteria for the detection of manipulation.

Keywords: stock market, stock exchange, trading volume, securities, asset pricing, market manipulation, market abuse, public company, public offering, listing, squeeze-out

The article assesses the effectiveness of counteracting abuse on the Ukrainian stock market. It has been revealed that the problem of improper legislative registration of counteraction to abuses in the stock market entails unsystematic and biased enforcement by the regulator (NSSMC). The author highlights that the proposed implementation of the requirements of MAR and MAD to the national legislation is inadequate both in the context of the market’s functional role in the economy and in the context of the unjustified extension of the regulator’s powers. It has been stated that ignoring these issues at the level of prospective legislation will not increase confidence in the stock market and will block incentives for its development, due to the following reasons:
- maintaining uncertainty of abuse criteria and their differences from accepted market practice will complicate regulation of economic relations, and establishment of "rules of the game";
- unreasonable, selective and subjective enforcement will reduce the effectiveness of the regulatory function, because market participants will not understand the causes and unobvious consequences of lawful and unlawful behavior;
- an imbalance in the rights and responsibilities between market participants and the regulator may raise doubts about the adequacy of the regulatory and compensatory functions to ensure effective regulation of legal relations in the market and to compensate for the consequences of unlawful actions of regulator employees.
It has been substantiated that the introduction of strict prohibitive norms into national legislation to counteract abuses in the stock market based on the implementation of the European approach should be as detailed as possible, unambiguous, and consistent with the immature state of the market. At the same time, prohibitive norms should be an integral part of systemic steps aimed at improving the quality of the market, and in its absence - a vector to stimulate development. It is necessary that in the conditions of market immaturity and the actual absence of individual segments, the strict prohibitions for abuse of market participants should be applied carefully and accompanied by the regulator’s symmetrical responsibility in case of insufficient substantiation and subjectivity of law enforcement.

Keywords:stock market, stock exchange, securities, public company, public offering, listing, information asymmetry, market manipulation, market abuse, insider dealing

The development of collective investment institutions (CIIs) in Ukraine is characterized by rather ambiguous and stable trends, which at first glance do not have any objective economic basis. The dynamics of CIIs activities in Ukraine demonstrates their steady invulnerability to the crises in the global and national economy, maintaining positions (in quantity terms) against the background of reduced number of both professional stock market participants and other institutional investors, and despite the decrease in the financial instruments in circulation, and the gradual formation in public consciousness of a neutral negative view of the functioning of the national stock market. The authors' assumption that the key to such institutional viability consists in the tax preferences for the CIIs, which is confirmed by the analysis. It is noted that in this case both the economic sense and the declared "collectivity" of this investment institution are distorted.
The use of CIIs solely to ease the tax burden, with gross legal and tax violations creates risks for both the beneficiaries of such tax schemes and for the very existence of the institution. The specificity of "investment areas" outside the stock market, the highly conditional performance of the function of accumulation of investment resources and, correspondingly, the profanation of the CIIs' issuer function, in particular as to the fair distribution of investment income, distortions of the essence of the ideology of collective investment in combination with extremely loyal regulation on the part of the NSSMC all presently call into question the entire possibility of considering CIIs as a full-fledged component of the stock market.

Keywords:stock market, stock exchange, securities, collective investment institutions, investment funds, institutional investors, financial institutions

The article points to the critically insufficient compliance of Ukraine's stock market infrastructure with the relevant international recommendations, first of all in the segment of securities settlements. The author states that despite the creation of market infrastructure in Ukraine and the possibility to avoid problems related to the evolutionary errors, the market participants face numerous difficulties, such as risks in legal empowerment and in the activities of key infrastructure actors, limited competition, excessive transaction costs, ongoing defragmentation of the system of depository accounting, as well as inconvenience and limitations of the existing risk management systems.
The study on the evolution of securities settlement models in Ukraine revealed that the radical reform of infrastructure in 2013 led to contradictory consequences, in particular, the abuse by the settlement bank and the central counterparty of its monopolistic positions, active participation of this monopolist in high-profile market abuse, stagnation in clearing and settlement technologies, and a slowdown in the development of the derivatives market. It was found that, despite lengthy discussions, the updated legislation in the field of organized capital markets, which is designed to implement a number of EU laws and should enter into force in 2021, does not really rectify the problems in the existing infrastructure, in particular due to a rather dubious proposed procedure of securities settlement and conservation for a few more years of the monopoly in the field of settlement and clearing services. It is substantiated that Ukraine has constructive practical experience and skills that can allow to implement the best international standards for building a system of cash settlements in "central bank money", organically integrated into Ukrainian payment system and able to adapt to European payment systems.

Keywords:Financial market infrastructure, stock market, stock exchange, securities, Central securities depository (CSD), Central counterparty (CCP), clearing, Delivery versus payment (DvP), payment system, Securities settlement system