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№ 1/2019
OSTASHKO Tamara Oleksiivna1, OLEFIR Volodymyr Kostiantynovych2
1Institute for Economics and Forecasting, NAS of Ukraine
2Institute for Economics and Forecasting, NAS of Ukraine
Prospects of free trade with China: development of domestic export and risks of import dependence
Economy and forecasting 2019; 1:124-152 | https://doi.org/10.15407/econforecast2019.01.124 |
ABSTRACT ▼
Development of the trade between Ukraine and China generates serious challenges for the national economy, because, presently, the trade with China accounts for more than a half of Ukraine's negative balance in this country's international trade in goods (56% in January-November 2018). Despite the risks of further deterioration of trade balance, Ukraine has suggested to start consultations on the Ukraine-China free-trade agreement (FTA).
The purpose of the paper is to estimate the possible impact of the liberalization of trade with China and to develop recommendations for raising exports and suppressing China's goods expansion on domestic market. In order to investigate the problem and shape the outlook for domestic exports to China, the following steps have been made: (1) compared the structure of external trade in goods of Ukraine and China; (2) evaluated the trade regimes' symmetry between China and Ukraine; (3) identified the characteristics of China's non-tariff trade regulations; (4) analyzed special ties features of negotiating with China on FTA; (5) analyzed the situation with the development of domestic export to China, and identified prospective markets for domestic goods; and (6) analyzed the dynamics of imports of goods from China during 2004-2018. Also, discussed the groups of import goods that are top items by absolute volume and possess a high share in imports and in local domestic consumption.
Analysis of the structure of trade flows between Ukraine and China showed that the most probable development scenario in the trade with China is the increased orientation of Ukrainian export on raw materials and empowering of Ukraine's dependence on the import of Chinese industrial goods. Probability of this scenario is increasing since the trade regimes of Ukraine and China are asymmetrical, which creates unequal conditions of trade that are more preferable for China. It was found that, even in case of trade liberalization as the result of FTA negotiations between China and Ukraine, Ukraine could not expect sustainable increase in exports of agri-food goods, as China has special non-tariff regulations in domestic agri-food markets.
Among the core directions of the government policy of supporting the development of agricultural export to China is promotion of corn export in accordance with the credit agreement of 2012 between State Food and Grain Corporation of Ukraine and Export-Import Bank of China, and soybean export promotion with the purpose to substitute US in the Chinese import soybean market, which opened up as a result of US-China trade disputes in 2017-2018. Negative trends in bilateral trade are the reason for active government policy promoting the export of processed goods to China, first of all the products of food industry and optical photographic instruments and apparatus that are of high demand in local Chinese markets.
Import dependence of domestic local market remains high without significant signs of decrease. In 2017, the ratio between import and GDP was the highest for the recent 17 years. During 2013-2017, this ratio increased from 0.51 to 0.56. Dependence of Ukraine's economy on import could increase further as a result of liberalization of the trade with China. Despite the benefits for exporters (mostly exporters of raw goods), cheap Chinese import could delay the renaissance of the domestic light industry that has gradually started after a sharp decline in 2013-2015.
Dynamics of goods import from China during 2004-2018 was analyzed, and discussed groups of goods that are the top import items by absolute volume, possess a high share in imports and in local domestic consumption. The research was conducted on agricultural and agri-food goods, and for 4- and 6- digit codes.
Presence of Chinese goods in domestic market is constantly increasing. In 2002-2003, balance of trade between Ukraine and China was positive, and the share of China's goods in market was below 2%, but, starting from 2005, the trade balance has been always negative with share of Chinese goods increasing to 13% (2018).
Machinery accounted for more than a half of Chinese import in 2018, with machinery, instruments and equipment making the highest share. China is the main exporter of telephone equipment for cellular networks, computers and notebooks, photo-sensitive semi-conductors, light-emitting diodes and other innovative and high technology products. China possesses top positions in imports of household electronics and appliances, light industry goods (shoes, toys, synthetic textiles etc.) and other goods. In 74 out of 178 analyzed 4-digit groups of goods, China's share in import in 2017 was higher than 50%.
From the position of domestic market protection, trade liberalization with China could cause high risks for domestic producers. Assortment of industrial goods that are imported from China is very extensive, hence their expansion in domestic market could be quite significant.
The publication was prepared during the research work "The modernization of economic policy of field of activities and markets development" (state registration number 0118U007329).
Keywords: People's Republic of China, Free Trade Agreement (FTA), trade regime, export, import dependence, protection of the domestic market
JEL: F13, F14
Article in English (pp. 124 - 152) | Download | Downloads :530 |
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№ 3/2020
OSTASHKO Tamara Oleksiivna1, KOBUTA Iryna Victorivna2
1Institute for Economics and Forecasting, NAS of Ukraine
2Markets and Trade Division, Economic and Social Development stream, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Unions
Changes in world trade and trade policy in the time of the COVID-19 pandemic: challenges and opportunities for Ukraine
Economy and forecasting 2020; 3:5-19 | https://doi.org/10.15407/econforecast2020.03.005 |
ABSTRACT ▼
The article analyzes the trends of world trade and features of trade policies across the world during the period of economic restrictions imposed to prevent the spread of COVID-19. It also analyzes the development of Ukraine’s foreign trade and trade policy measures, which are applied by the government in the pandemic. Based on the identification of challenges and opportunities for the development of this country’s foreign trade during this pandemic and the analysis of forecasts and recommendations of international organizations, the authors substantiate proposals on the directions of Ukraine’s trade policy with an emphasis on the agri-food market.
A comparison of world trade developments in 2020 and 2021 forecasted by international organizations is made in the article. In the first half of 2020, the world trade development was closer toward the optimistic scenario of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Bank scenario, but the expected second wave of the pandemic may return the world trade trend to the WTO pessimistic scenario, where the world trade could be reduced by 31,9% in 2020. The development of Ukraine's foreign trade also shows a trend close toward the more optimistic scenarios of international organizations - in the first half of 2020 the country’s foreign trade volume only decreased by 10.6% compared to the first half of 2019. In the article, the main channels of the COVID-19 impact on the world trade are indicated, namely: reduction of the production of goods and services due to restrictions on economic activity imposed by countries, disruption of global value chains, rising commercial costs, sharp decline in services, and price decrease of goods with low degree of processing.
As in the rest of the world, the negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic in Ukraine are largely mitigated by the spread of digital technologies in trade, and conversely, the pandemic stimulates their development. Already in the second quarter of 2020, Ukraine’s exports of ICT services resumed growth and exceeded the pre-crisis level of the fourth quarter of 2019. The authors identify advantages and issues of accelerated digitalization of trade in the pandemic.
The protection measures introduced by countries, including Ukraine, after the spread of coronavirus, are analyzed, with an emphasis on policy measures related to agri-food trade. It is proved that the limit of wheat exports during the pandemic is the result of annual memorandum of grain market players, so it cannot be considered a policy measure restricting trade. It was also proved that the ban on the export of buckwheat introduced by the Ukrainian government, which expired on July 1, 2020, had of a rather political nature, since the supply of buckwheat on the domestic market and the level of consumer prices for this product were guaranteed by import deliveries. This conclusion applies to other goods of significant social importance, whose imports increased significantly during the pandemic, especially for products of animal origin.
The directions of the formation of Ukraine’s trade policy in the conditions of world trade changes and trade policies revision are determined. The spread of the trend towards country self-sufficiency in food will lead to a reduction in food chains, a decrease in import dependence, an increase in state support and, as a result, a strengthening of competitive position of domestic producers. Therefore, full and timely financing of state budgetary programs to support agriculture in Ukraine is of particular importance. In order to strengthen the competitiveness of small and medium-sized agricultural producers in the context of the accelerated digitalization of trade as a result of the pandemic, it is necessary to rapidly develop the infrastructure that provides rural areas with high-speed fixed broadband Internet access. Along with the spread of protectionism in world trade, there is an opposite trend of liberalization of agri-food markets, typical for food-importing countries. Thus, the countries-exporters of agri-food products, which include Ukraine, will have easier access to the markets of these countries, new markets will open, and the situation on export markets will improve.
Keywords:world trade, trade policy, COVID-19 pandemic, agri-food trade, protectionism
JEL: F13, F14
Article in English (pp. 5 - 19) | Download | Downloads :446 |
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№ 4/2021
1Institute for Economics and Forecasting, NAS of Ukraine
MULTIPOLARITY OF THE WORLD TRADE: CHALLENGES AND "CORRIDOR OF OPPORTUNITIES" FOR UKRAINE
Economy and forecasting 2021; 4:24-43 | https://doi.org/10.15407/econforecast2021.04.024 |
ABSTRACT ▼
The paper discusses trends of the world trade development towards multipolarity that is caused by the increasing impact of “newly emerged” leaders, in particular China, and weakening of the domination of “traditional” transatlantic leaders. The development of multipolarity in the world trade is supported by the processes of trade regionalization, especially by signing of megaregional trade agreements on the base of the current balance of power in the world trade.
The details of the regional trade agreements concluded by the world trade leaders – USA, EU and China are described. The academic discussion on the role of Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) leads to the conclusions that creation of RCEP will induce the creation of a new world trade pole in Asia and the Pacific region during the next decades, where China will play a leading role.
The future of the World Trade Organization and the WTO fundamental principle of multilateral trade relations is the most controversial issue in connection with the development of multipolarity of the world trade. Challenges that were faced by the WTO due to trade digitalization, COVID-19 pandemic and climate changes are analyzed, alongside with sources and causes of the WTO crisis. The spreading of economic patriotism (nationalism) trend that manifests itself in trade as a policy of protectionism is discussed in the context of the transition to multipolarity in the world trade.
The development of multipolarity in the world trade is followed by the processes that must be considered in the shaping of Ukrainian trade policy. The ability of Ukraine to get its “space for maneuver”, which will allow to increase the country's economic potential in the framework of the new world trade configuration, depends upon this country's trade policy that is grounded on the analysis of risks and opportunities in the trade relations with “major players” in the world trade.
Development of the trade with China creates significant risks of the increasing of raw materials orientation of export and strengthening dependence on the import of industrial goods from China. Vital risks also follow signing of the credit and investment agreements with China. Chinese investment in agriculture and food industry are the riskiest as they use natural potential of the recipient countries and Chinese technologies to diversify the sources of the food import to China. The shaping of the Ukrainian trade policy with the EU countries in the medium term will be influenced by latter’s new trade policy of Open Strategic Autonomy. The main challenge is created by the EU plans to implement the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which provides for the import tax on the import of the electricity, cement, aluminum, fertilizers, and products from steel and iron. The opportunities, created by the new EU trade policy for Ukraine have emerged due to the EU's declared support to the countries of the Eastern Partnership that have DCFTA with EU, including green and digital transition. The principle of “autonomy” in the new EU trade policy emphasizes the EU's ability to make its own choices, reflecting its strategic interests, which has features of the policy of economic nationalism and protectionism and will create a “corridor of opportunities” for pursuing protection measures for the development of domestic industries
Keywords:multipolarity, world trade, trade policy, regional trade agreements, economic nationalism
JEL: F13, F14
Article in English (pp. 24 - 43) | Download | Downloads :33 |
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23. Trade Policy Review - An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy (2021, 18 Feb). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Brussels. Retrieved from trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2021/february/tradoc_159438.pdf
24. World Trade Organization (2020). World Trade Statistical Review 2020. Retrieved from www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/wts2020_e/wts2020_e.pdf; doi.org/10.30875/0a4fefd8-en
25. Ostashko, T., Olefir, V., Venger, V., & Boiko, O. (2021). A Comparative Analysis of the Trade and Industrial Policies of Ukraine and China in the Context of the OBOR Initiative. Comparative Economic Research. Central and Eastern Europe, 24: 2, 119-136. doi.org/10.18778/1508-2008.24.15
26. Ostashko, T. (Ed.). (2020). Modernization of the economic policy of development of activities and markets: in 4 parts. Part 2: Trading Policy: Prospects for Ukraine's participation in the initiative "One Belt, One Path". Institute for economics and forecasting, NAS of Ukraine. Kyiv. Retrieved from ief.org.ua/docs/mg/326.pdf [in Ukrainian].
27. European Green Deal: Commission proposes transformation of EU economy and society to meet climate ambitions. Press release (2021, July 14). Brussels. Retrieved from ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_3541
28. Dumitru, A., Kölbl, B., Wijffelaa, M. (2021 July 16). The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism explained. Rabobank publications.. Retrieved from economics.rabobank.com/publications/2021/july/cbam-carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism-eu-explained/
29. Europe fit for the Digital Age: Commission proposes new rules for digital platforms. Retrieved from ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2347
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